corresponding jurisdictional differences in the sentencing of white-collar cases? and (3) Within jurisdictions, are there further differences in the factors that influence sentencing decisions in white-collar as compared to other kinds of cases? The data are analyzed from a perspective that emphasizes organizational considerations: we conceptualize the criminal justice process as a loosely coupled system and the use of prosecutorial resources as proactive and reactive. We argue that the expanded prosecution of white-collar persons for their white-collar crimes requires a proactive prosecutorial policy and a tightening of the coupling between plea negotiations and sentencing decisions in the prosecutorial and judicial subsystems. Our quantitative analysis reveals that one district follows a uniquely proactive pattern. As expected, this proactive district also exhibits a unique leniency in the sentencing of college educated white-collar criminals that is related to earlier plea and charging decisions. A rather different and unanticipated pattern of leniency is found in this district for less educated white-collar offenders. A conclusion of this study is that there may be an inverse relationship between the volume of white-collar prosecutions and the severity with which they are sentenced.
The existence of systematic links between the status characteristics of criminal offenders and the sentences they receive has been debated for some time (see Hagan, 1974) . This debate is grounded in issues of theory and policy. For example, Chiricos and Waldo (1975) regard a relationship between class position and sentencing as crucial to one prominent version (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971 ) of a conflict theory of crime, while the absence of such a relationship is usually deemed essential to notions of "equality before the law." It therefore is not surprising that this type of debate has generated a large volume of research (see Nettier, 1979:40-6) . What is surprising is the inconclusiveness of the findings that flow from this work.
The problem is not simply that these findings are inconsistent, although they are that. For all the studies that find little (e.g., Bernstein et al., 1977) or no (e.g., Chiricos and Waldo, 1975) relationship between status characteristics and sentencing, there are still those that find this relationship to be substantial (e.g., Swigert and Farrell, 1977; Lizotte, 1978) .
However, the larger issue is that the data sets on which these studies are based are widely thought to be inadequate. Specifically, critics (e.g., Greenberg, 1977; Hopkins, 1977; Reasons, 1977) note that the samples considered in these studies consist almost entirely of low status defendants, making this research mainly a matter of within-rather than between-class comparisons. Thus, while (to date) research of this type has focused on the sentencing of "traditional" or "common" DIFFERENTIAL SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS 803 crimes (e.g., murder, robbery, larceny, etc.), Hopkins (1977:177) (Kennedy, 1970) . That is, much of this white-collar "indiscretion" is handled in the civil courts, or not dealt with at all. Reiss (1971; conceptualizes the criminal justice system as a loosely articulated operating network of inputoutput relationships among a series of subsystems; a set of relationships that we 1 These interviews were conducted over a tenweek period, with one week spent in each of the ten districts. The ten jurisdictions comprise a purposive sample selected by the Supreme Court (under provisions of the Speedy Trial Act; see fn. 4) and intended to maximize the representation of major metropolitan and geographic areas across the United States. The first two authors of this paper conducted the interviews together, using a set of structured, open-ended interview schedules that are available on request. Our purpose was to interview a crosssection of court personnel across the ten districts.
Unedited excerpts from these interviews are quoted in this article. One Chief Judge refused to be interviewed and two U.S. Attorneys were not available for interviews. However, the First Assistant to each of the latter U.S. Attorneys was interviewed and our coverage otherwise was quite comprehensive. These qualitative data were generated to correspond to the quantitative data discussed later in this paper. see also Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . Discretion is dispersed throughout this system, and mechanisms for systematizing this discretion appear to be the exception as much as the rule.
Thus, Gibbs (1978: 105) observes that ". . .
the system actually appears to be an ungoverned mishmash, " and Eisenstein and Jacob (1977:37) note that even "the judge does not rule or govern; at most, he manages, and often he is managed by others." Reiss (1971:120) goes on to suggest that "the major means of control among the subsystems is internal to each" with the significant consequence that "each subsystem creates its own system of justice." This situation becomes problematic when the attempt is made in such a system to establish or shift policies and priorities. Indeed, one of the fascinating features of loosely coupled systems is their ability to circumvent such changes (see Meyer and Rowan, 1977 ).
Yet important changes in policies and
priorities sometimes do occur, with systemwide repercussions. Within the criminal justice system, such changes are often implemented through the prosecutorial subsystem. Reiss (1974:690) indicates why and how:
By legal authority and by practice, prosecutors have the greatest discretion in the formally organized criminal justice network.
... The way that prosecutors exercise discretion over input and output varies considerably among jurisdictions. This variation is due partly to the organized forms of discretion available to a prosecutor in a given jurisdiction and partly to historical practice within that office. The discretionary decisions of prosecutors whether or not to file information can exercise substantial control over input into the system, while the quantity and quality of output are determined mainly by their decisions to nol pros or to plea bargain.
Drawing from Reiss (1971) , Black (1973) and our own interviews, we suggest that this prosecutorial power can be exercised in two principal ways.
On the one hand, prosecutors can follow a reactive policy of law enforcement. and you aren't going to get anything. After that is all done, then we will put you in the grand jury and we will get the information anyway and you won't get any credit for it.
Indeed at sentencing we will stand up and make a point of the fact that you refused to cooperate and that will be held against you and you will get even more time.
The proactive prosecution of whitecollar persons and their white-collar crimes, therefore, comes down to the problem of how to get the leverage required to "turn witnesses," and the key to obtaining this leverage is to forge a connection between plea negotiations and concessions and coercion in sentencing.
In other words, prosecutors must overcome the tendency toward loose coupling between most parts of the criminal justice system, establishing instead a direct connection between plea negotiations and sentencing decisions in white-collar cases. and the white-collar crimes of the college educated. As indicated earlier, the latter type of case is of greatest interest to us because it is the "purest" form of whitecollar crime we can identify and because we expect prosecution of this type of case to exhibit the most interesting variation across districts.
The first step in our analysis was to examine the distribution of prosecutions and dispositions for the four offenderoffense combinations in all ten districts.
What we found was a striking similarity in these distributions for nine of the ten districts. The tenth, which we call District C, (678) X sentence = 4.13 X sentence = 3.49 X sentence = 4.43 X sentence = 4.64
Convictions
Income (1974-1977 $) Income (1974-1977 $) Crime 13,776-13,777+ 13,776-13,777+ Long, 1979) . The other side of this situation is that college educated persons, also, of course, are prosecuted and convicted for common crimes.
In We have also included in Table 1 mean sentence scores (see Table 2 Fourth, the largest disparity in mean sentences reported in Table 1 Table 2 presents the variables and their codings to be considered in this analysis.
METHODS AND MEASUREMENT
Variables are included on the basis of the perspective outlined above, prior research (e.g., Hagan, 1974; Chiricos and Waldo, 1975; Burke and Turk, 1975; Bernstein et al., 1977; Nagel, 1980; Swigert and Farrell, 1977) , concerns for multicollinearity, and suggestions arising from our inter- 
1979:470)
The implication is that in the federal system the plea itself may be a more potent variable than the charge reduction.
The next three variables in Table 2 The last variable in Table 2 , sentence severity, is our dependent variable. The coding of this variable derives from the efforts of Tiffany et al. (1975) (Hargens, 1976) .
Therefore, both coefficients are reported in our tables. However, there are some instances where unstandardized coefficients will be more suitable for our purposes. For example, the standardization of dummy variable coefficients can be misleading, particularly when the distributions of these variables are skewed (Cohen and Cohen, 1975:184) . Therefore, where dummy variables are involved, unstandardized coefficients will be emphasized in the analysis that follows.
THE ANALYSIS
The results of the first part of our analysis are presented in Table 3. This   table reports Table 3 provides provisional support for the perspective we have proposed: with a variety of other important variables held constant, our proactive distirct does grant lenient sentences to college educated We take this as one indication of a tightening of connections in an otherwise loosely coupled system. Beyond this, however, we are anxious to determine where such a tightening in subsystem op- Table 5 , and for the cases of less educated white-collar criminals in Table 4 , are negligible (B = .02 and .09).
To extend our understanding of this rather striking difference, we generated the frequency distributions of statutory seriousness in both District C and the remaining districts. These distributions are presented in Table 6 . What we find is that, although this variable has approximately the same standard deviation in District C (s = 5.90) and in the other districts (s = 5.79), the difference between these distributions is nonetheless dramatic. In District C, the modal initial charge carries a maximum sentence of one year in prison; in the remaining districts, the modal initial charge carries a Reform Act, as well as in the state courts (see Bernstein et al., 1977) .
CONCLUSIONS
Gilbert Geis (1974) has made two important points about the study of whitecollar crime. The first point is that relatively few original pieces of research have been published on white-collar crime during the past two decades (see also Wheeler, 1976 
